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Comments and Casenotes
THE CONFUSING MARYLAND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS PROCEDURES
The greatly over-worked visitor from another planet
-whose consternation is so frequently invoked in order
to pillory an established institution-should have his at-
tention directed toward the confusing nature of the va-
rious procedures available for directly litigating domestic
relations problems in Maryland law. For it would be
hard to imagine a system of procedure more affected with
the taints of paradox, anachronism, overlapping devices,
and historical encrustations than the one under discussion.
Many domestic relations problems are but specific types
of general legal matters which can probably be handled
best by the procedural devices worked out for all such
problems in general. Thus, suits for breach of promise
to marry are, after all, but suits to enforce contracts and
are best suited to be litigated along with all contract mat-
ters. Seduction, criminal conversation, alienation of af-
fections," and wilful or negligent acts depriving the parent
or husband of the services of the child or wife are, es-
sentially, torts and are best litigated as items in the gen-
eral tort procedure2 . The property rights of husband and
wife,' and of parent and child4 (including legitimacy),'
" Consider that, in a few other states, by recent statutory enactments,
the actions for breach of promise, seduction, criminal conversation, and
alienation of affections, or various of them, have been abolished. The idea
back of this seems to be that the damages for these are incapable of
accurate measurement and that such actions are likely to permit of
legalized blackmail.
2 See, on the question of parental responsibility for torts of children,
Note, Liability of Parents for Tort of Child (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 288,
noting the following cases: Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips, et al, 166 Md. 151,
178 A. 582 (1934); Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120, 177 A. 174(1935); Kerrigan v. Carroll, et al., 168 Md. 682, 179 A. 53 (1935); and
Carroll et al v. Kerrigen (sic), 173 Md. 627, 197 A. 127 (1938). On torts
between members of the same family, see Note, Tort Suit by Wife Against
Husband's Partnership (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 65, noting David v. David,
161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1100 (1931).
8 On one aspect of the property rights of husband and wife, see Note,
Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share-Legislative Change (1939) 3 Md. L.
Rev. 371, noting Marriott v. Marriott, et'al, 175 Md. 567, 3 A. (2d) 493
(1939).
'Concerning parent and child property matters, see Lentz, Revocation
of a Will by Birth of a Child (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 32; and the subsequent
statute, Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 303.
5 On legitimacy see the recent statutes collected in Comment, Domestic
Relations Legislation at the 1987 'Session (1937) 2 Md. L. Rev. 59; and
Note, The "Lord Mansfield Rule" as to "Bastardizing the Issue" (1938) 3
Md. L. Rev. 79, noting Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339. 196 A. 318
(1938) : and Hale v. State. 175 Md. 319, 2 A. (2d) 17 (1938).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
can better be adjusted in the tribunals and according to
the procedures available for handling all property matters.
But there are four types of domestic relations prob-
lems which are peculiar to the field, which fit into no es-
tablished niche of general procedure law, and for which
procedures have to be worked out which serve no gen-
eral function other than domestic relations ones. To these
the attention of this comment is directed. In the best of
all possible worlds there would be a single procedure for
each, all administered by a single domestic relations court,
one especially designated for the purpose. It would seem
bad enough to distribute these four functions among sepa-
rate tribunals. It is far worse to do not only this, but
to set up different techniques for adjudicating the same
problem, and to have the differences depend on formulae
not related to the basic objective of an intelligent deter-
mination of domestic relations matters. And yet this lat-
ter is exactly what the Maryland domestic relations pro-
cedure now comes to.
The four types of domestic relations problems calling
for specialized procedures are (1) directly6 declaring the
validity or invalidity of marriage (annulment and declara-
tory judgment); (2) legally terminating marital relations
(absolute and partial divorce, and separate maintenance);
(3) adjudicating the custody of children; and, (4) com-
pelling the support of dependents. Adoption might be
regarded as a fifth and separate type of proceeding, al-
though herein it will be grouped with other procedures
for determining custody.7
Examination of the Maryland scene discloses that there
are four (perhaps five) procedures available for directly
8 Validity of marriage may also be raised collaterally, in any proceeding,
with reference to those Impediments which render the marriage totally
void, rather than merely voidable.
7 Adoption, of course, has other implications than the custody one. Thus,
as a result, the adopting parent acquires the duty to support the adopted
child during the latter's Infancy, and the adopted person probably comes
under the criminal statutes to compel support of destitute parents. Then,
too, the adopted child becomes the heir of the adopting parent in the event
of the latter's intestacy, although It Is not so clear that the adopting parent
becomes the heir of the child. So, too, adoption of a child may, if the
other circumstances are appropriate, effect either a complete or a pro tanto
revocation of a previous will of the adopting parent, under Md. Laws 1937,
Ch. 303. From the procedural standpoint, however, adoption is primarily
a custody proceeding, and so it is classified here, although, of course, such
implications are absent in the case of adoption of an adult under Md. Laws
1937, Ch. 172. In connection with adoption, consider Md. Laws 1937, Ch.
49, authorizing the substitution of a birth certificate having the names of
the adopting parents for the original certificate showing the names of the
natural parents.
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attacking (and perhaps one for asserting) the validity of
a questionable marriage, which procedures are assigned
indiscriminately to all three of the basic types of courts
(law, equity and criminal) which exist in Maryland. Then,
in addition to the inescapable distinction between absolute
and partial divorce, there are two different procedures
available for substantially achieving the latter result (di-
vorce a mensa et thoro, and separate maintenance or ali-
mony without divorce), not to mention the statutory rec-
ognition of separation agreements, which also achieve that
substantial result by agreement of the parties. A count
of the procedures and methods available for determining
custody of children runs to as high as ten, depending on
the classification used. Support of dependents is handled,
as the case may arise, by the common law courts, the
equity courts, the criminal courts, and by consent pro-
ceedings in the offices of the prosecuting attorneys. There
are one type of common law procedure for support, four
types of equity orders, and three types of criminal pro-
cedures which last are handled either by the criminal
courts or in the prosecutors' offices. Let us now examine
the picture in detail.
Declaring the validity or invalidity of marriage.
Annulment procedures serve a dual function, depend-
ing on the effect of the type of impediment to marriage
which is asserted." For those impediments which render
the marriage totally void, and which can be asserted col-
laterally, an annulment is but a declaratory ruling of the
invalidity of the marriage, not necessary to be had in order
later to assert such invalidity, but desirable in that the
matter can be settled while the evidence is relatively fresh.
For those impediments which render the marriage merely
voidable by proceeding, and which cannot, therefore, be as-
serted collaterally, an annulment is a necessary step which
must occur before the invalidity of the marriage can ever
be relied on. The Maryland annulment procedures serve
these two purposes interchangeably for, while various
separate procedures are provided, yet the differences are
not taken according to the distinctions between totally
void and merely voidable marriages, but accidentally, ac-
cording to the type of impediment, as has suited the fancies
of the judicial and legislative architects of the scheme.
8 On annulment in general, and on the difference between void and void-
able marriages, see Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland
and their Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211.
1940]
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Two of the annulment techniques available in Mary-
land have been established by a single statute' and are
usable only for the impediments of bigamy and incest, the
former of which makes the marriage totally void, and the
latter of which makes it merely voidable by proceeding."0
This statute provides for the annulment of such marriages
either upon a civil petition by one of the parties in the
Superior Court of Baltimore City (a law court)" or in
the Circuit Courts in the counties; or upon indictment and
conviction for the bigamy or incest in the Criminal Court
of Baltimore City or on the criminal side of the Circuit
Courts in the counties.12  These two methods could be
dubbed "statutory methods".
A third method is the statutory "divorce method". 3
For impotence and for any ground making the marriage
"void ab initio" (whatever that means)" an absolute di-
vorce may be granted. Establishment of these "pre-ven-
ient" divorce grounds comes, in substance, to granting an-
nulments, in the name of divorce, for the stated reasons.
The fourth method, the "general equity method," has been
judicially arrived at.15 Because of the inherent general
power of courts of equity over the reformation and re-
scission of contracts for fraud, these courts (the two Cir-
cuit Courts of Baltimore City and the equity side of the
county Circuit Courts) exercise (along with their divorce
jurisdiction) the power to grant annulments (on original
bill in equity) for lack of marital intention, insanity, in-
toxication, fraud, and duress. 6
Those four methods exist to attack the validity of a
given marriage, and they apply only in favor of the one
Md. Code (1924) Art. 62, Sec. 14.
2 0 Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658 (1864).
11 At the time this Jurisdiction was conferred on the Superior Court, it
had equity powers, since taken away without any change in the annulment
statute. On this see the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 250.
12 It is interesting to speculate whether, without the specific statutory
declaration that a criminal conviction shall serve as an annulment, such
a result would follow anyhow, either for totally void or merely voidable
marriages. For a suggestion to the effect that the result would follow, see
the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 254, concerning the res ad-
Judicata problem with reference to inter-racial marriages which are both
totally void and have criminal consequences.
11 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, See. 38, as amended Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 396,
and Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 558.
1, For speculation as to the content of the "void ab initio" ground, see
the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 213-214, 251.
15 See Ibid., 251-252.
See, concerning both fraud and duress, Note, Annulment of Marriage
for Duress where Pre-Marital Relations have Occurred (1937) 1 Md. L.
Rev. 348, noting Lurz v. Lurz, 170 Md. 428, 184 A. 906, 185 A. 676 (1936).
[VOL. IV278
1940] CONFUSING PROCEDURES
asserting invalidity. A possible'7 fifth method for doing
this' and one also possibly available for asserting the va-
lidity of marriage, and running in favor of the one seek-
ing to establish it,'" is the extensive declaratory judgment
procedure adopted in Maryland in 1939 with the enact-
ment of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.20 In-
terpretation of the Act on this score by the Maryland
courts is yet to come, but it, or similarly extensive declara-
tory judgment procedures, have been used in other jur-
isdictions both for attacking and establishing the validity
of marriages.2' It is to be hoped that the Act will be held
to cover this, as there has long been a need for some local
direct procedure available to establish marriages.22
There is more vice to the situation than the confusion
resulting from duplication of function. There are sub-
stantial differences among the various impediments which
result from their being assigned to the different procedures,
and these differences ought not to be. Thus impotence,
which probably23 can only be asserted by the divorce meth-
od, requires corroboration of the plaintiff24 and two years
11 It will not be surprising if use of the Declaratory Judgment procedure
is denied to the extent that existing procedures afford exactly the same
relief. On this, with reference to another type of problem, see Pennsyl-
vania Threshermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch
et al., Balto. Daily Record, March 15, 1940 (Sup. Ct. Balto. C. 1940).is Despite the suggestion in the preceding footnote, there are situations
wherein the use of the Declaratory Judgment procedure to attack a mar-
riage might be a solution, and where, at present, there is no clear pro-
cedure afforded. Thus there is doubt whether any procedure Is already
available for the impediments of lack of solemnization, non-age, and mis-
cegenation, on which see the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211,
224, 232, 235, 252. On the desirability of some Declaratory Judgment pro-
cedure, see Ibid., 252-256. Then, too there is clearly no present procedure
for attacking the marriage, and so the Declaratory Judgment one should
apply, in the following situation: A and B are validly married. One of
them later obtains a divorce of that marriage in another State than Mary-
land under circumstances raising doubt as to whether Maryland will rec-
ognize the divorce (questionable residence of one or both in the granting
State). Either A or B is desirous of marrying a third person In Maryland
without running the risk of a bigamy prosecution. He or she Is anxious
for a declaratory ruling whether Maryland will recognize the foreign di-
vorce so as to know whether the later marriage will be both non-criminal
and civilly valid. In this situation it is clear that no present procedure
is available, and yet it Is one where a declaratory ruling Is very desirable
to attack the (first) marriage on the ground of its cessation.19 On the proof necessary to establish a marriage, whether the question
arises directly or collaterally, see Myerberg, Proof of Marriage in Mary-
land (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 120.
20 Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 294.
21 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 391-395.
2 See the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 252-256.
"See Ibid., 235-236, 251, for speculation on this point.
24 Md. Code (1924) Art. 35, Sec. 4. On corroboration see Note, Need for
Corroboration of Plaintiff in a Suit for Alimony Without Divorce (1937)
1 Md. L. Rev. 266, noting Roeder v. Roeder, 170 Md. 579, 185 A. 458 (1936).
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residence of one spouse (if the ground occurred out of
the state) 25 under the applicable divorce rules, while fraud,
which is litigated under the general equity method, is not
subject to these requirements. On the other hand, those
grounds to be litigated by the divorce method have favor-
able rules as to territorial jurisdiction (residence of either
spouse)26 and service by publication,27 while both these
points are *in considerable doubt under the other meth-
ods.28 There seems no rhyme or reason for having these
tactical distinctions between procedures which ought to
be governed by the same rules. For some grounds (cer-
tain of those making "void ab initio") there seems a choice
of procedures, while for others only one is provided 9 and
for some there is doubt whether any is available.30
It would seem desirable to place all marriage impedi-
ments on the same plane with reference to jurisdictional
and proof requirements. Merging all annulment pro-
cedures in the declaratory judgment one would be one
way of accomplishing this. Another would be to extend
the divorce ground of "void ab initio" specifically to in-
clude, also, "merely voidable", and thus all defective mar-
riages could surely be attacked by the divorce method.
The result of this would be, however, that all the encrusted
rules peculiar to divorce for supervenient grounds would
apply, although they should not, in all justice, be applied.
Another flaw in our annulment procedure is the lack
of any statutory provision, found frequently in other states,
preserving the legitimacy of the children of void, or void-
able and avoided marriages. Extension of the "void ab
initio" divorce ground more certainly to cover "merely
voidable", plus express declaration of such intent, might
accomplish this result. While that result might have been
contemplated by the drafters of the original "void ab ini-
tio" ground, yet, as it stands, the result hardly followed.8
25 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 40.
20 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 16, Sec. 37.
27 Ibid.
28 See the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 256-259.
2" Ibid., 250-252.
so Ibid., 224, 232, 235, 252, concerning lack of solemnization, miscegena-
tion, and age. On the possible implications of the recent change in the age
for marriage, see Comment, A Query About the New Marriage Age Law
(1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 340.
31 For speculation about this, see the article cited, supra n. 8. 2 Md. L.
Rev. 211, 213-215.
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Legally Terminating Marital Relations.
It has long been the policy of the State to afford two
basically different procedures of this sort, having entirely
separate objectives, although both serve to terminate
marital relations. No criticism of the basic distinction is
sought to be offered. 2 The existence of the distinction is
inescapable as a matter of present State policy and the in-
stant discussion will only point out paradoxes, anachron-
isms, and duplications within each separate procedure.
The basic distinction herein is between absolute divorce
(a vinculo matrimonii)3 and partial divorce (a mensa et
thoro) 4 and other procedures similar to the latter. They
differ in that the former is permanent, permits remarriage,
and terminates property claims; while the latter is not
permanent, does not permit remarriage, does not termi-
nate property claims, and at best serves only to legalize
the living apart of the spouses, determine who is at fault,
and provide support for the wife if she is entitled to it.
One procedure only is provided for obtaining an abso-
lute divorce, and so there is no duplication therein. One
paradoxical provision, at least, exists within it. This is
the provision for granting an absolute divorce for the two
pre-venient grounds of impotence and anything making
the marriage "void ab initio." Not only is the meaning
of the latter phrase obscure,85 so that it is not completely
understood what marriage impediments may be litigated
under it, but the existence of the pre-venient grounds poses
difficult (and as yet unanswered) questions in general con-
cerning the right of a plaintiff wife to permanent alimony
for these grounds, and the legitimacy of children where
the divorce is granted for the second named one. 6 It was
pointed out earlier herein that setting up the pre-venient
grounds for absolute divorce (in effect granting annul-
ments therefor in the name of divorce) had unfortunate
consequences. It is submitted that it would be better to
make these into grounds for annulment instead, and to
32 To be sure, some of the other states have no partial divorce, others
grant It only for a limited period, and still others permit a defendant who
is partially divorced later, and after the lapse of a stated period, to obtain
an absolute divorce on the basis of a separation continued for the statu-
tory period.
"Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 396,
and Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 558.
", Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 39.
"1 See the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 213-215, 251.
'1 There is obviously no problem when the divorce Is granted for im-
potence.
1940]
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grant absolute divorces only for the recognized super-
venient grounds, which now include adultery, three years
wilful desertion and abandonment, and five years volun-
tary separation.
It is with reference to the local procedures for legal-
ized separation short of absolute divorce that the great-
est paradoxes appear. For there are two different judicial
procedures for attaining substantially that end, and also
statutory recognition of separation agreements," which
reach that same objective by agreement of the parties.
All three have in common that the living apart is legal-
ized, that the parties are not free to remarry, and that
support for the wife can be provided for if it is necessary
and proper. The two judicial procedures also have in com-
mon 9 that fault is determined, property claims are not
affected, and that the status may be terminated or modi-
fied for supervening circumstances. For that matter, sepa-
ration agreements, by special provisions, may also deal
with these three elements. Frequently some of the terms
of separation agreements are, by consent, incorporated into
divorce decrees.
The most paradoxical aspect of the situation is the
phenomenon of having two judicial procedures accom-
plishing substantially the same end. These are divorce a
mensa et thoro4 ° and the separate equitable proceeding for
separate maintenance or "alimony without divorce."'" The
former procedure was set up in 184142 when, for the first
time, judicial divorce so-called was established in Mary-
land, and both a vinculo and a mensa divorces were pro-
vided for. The later procedure is of much more ancient
", This last-named ground was added in 1937, Md. Code (1924) Art. 16,
See. 38, as amended Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 396, and Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 558.
See, concerning It, Note, Five Years Voluntary Separation as New Ground
for Absolute Divorce (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 357, noting Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938). See also France v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 4 A. (2d) 717 (Md. 1939) ; and Miller v. Miller, 11 A. (2d) 630
(Md. 1940).
" Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 16. See. 39A.
19 See Note, Proper Venue of Suit for Alimony Without Divorce-Ouster
of Jurisdiction-Amendment (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 81. 82-S2. noting Wood-
cock v. Woodcock, 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (19.95).
40 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, See. 39.
" Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 14.
12 Prior to 1841 the only divorce possible in Maryland was legislative.
From 1841 to 1851 there were both legislative and judicial divorce. The
Constitution of 1851 forbade further legislative divorces and so since that
date all divorce is Judicial. See the present Md. Const., Art. 3. See. 33, to
the same effect.
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origin and has its roots in provincial times.4 Apparently
it did not occur to the drafters of the divorce laws in 1841
to abolish the pre-existing practice and so it is that for
a century they have existed side by side.
The grounds for divorce a mensa, which may be sought
by either wife or husband, are cruelty, excessively vicious
conduct, and desertion or abandonment (of any dura-
tion). The grounds for "alimony without divorce", which
may be sought only by a wife, include those, and, as well,
any of the grounds for absolute divorce alone, i. e., adul-
tery,44 (possibly)45 five years voluntary separation, and
(possibly)" the pre-venient grounds. Thus it is that if a
husband desires a legal separation, he has but one pro-
cedure to look to, and can obtain the relief only for cruelty,
vicious conduct, or desertion; while the wife as plaintiff
has two procedures to choose from if those be the grounds,
and can also seek the relief by asking for separate mainte-
nance for the absolute divorce grounds. For those last-
named grounds47 the husband must take absolute divorce
(permitting the wife to remarry) or nothing, while the
wife is permitted to obtain alimony without permitting
the husband to remarry, if she uses the older procedure.
This should not be so.
In addition to the substantial unfairness of the situa-
tion, outlined above, there are other paradoxes implicit in
the duplication. If the relief be sought by a mensa di-
vorce, the case may be brought either where the plaintiff
resides or where the defendant does.4 1 If the wife seeks
it by separate maintenance, the action lies only in the
" See MARSHAuL AND MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT-MABYLAND (1932) 97 et
seq., to the effect that Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 14, first enacted by Md.
Laws 1777, Ch. 12, Sec. 14, merely ratified the pre-existing practice before
1777 whereby the Chancellors granted alimony without divorce, although
without authority of any statute.
"1 Three years abandonment is also a ground for absolute divorce, but
for it the wife has three choices, 1. e., partial divorce (as for abandonment
of any duration), absolute divorce, and alimony without divorce.
" The question whether a wife may obtain permanent alimony for the
five year voluntary separation ground is still an open one in Maryland.
See Note, Five Years Voluntary Separation as New Ground for Absolute
Divorce (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 357, 360, noting Campbell v. Campbell. 174
Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938).
,6 See concerning this, the article cited, supra n. 8, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211.
251, n. 161.
'7 To be sure, if the wife's misconduct consists of an abandonment of
more than three years duration, the *husband does have the election of
taking a partial divorce (as for abandonment of any duration) and thus
can prevent the wife from marrying another, although he also debars him-
self from ever obtaining an absolute divorce for such abandonment. Miller
v. Miller, 153 Md. 213, 138 A. 22 (1927) ; Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 41.
"8 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 16, Sec. 37.
1940]
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county of the husband's residence.4" There is consider-
able doubt whether the divorce requirement of corrobora-
tion of plaintiff, clearly applicable in a divorce suit so-
called, also applies if "alimony without divorce" be sought
instead for a divorce ground. ° All of this, of course, does
not make for an intelligent administration of domestic re-
lations litigation.
Separate maintenance is essentially a support pro-
cedure, and the status implications are incidental. A mensa
divorce is primarily a status procedure, with the support
aspect incidental. There is no need for continuing the
paradoxical duplication, so long as all aspects can be pro-
vided for in a single action. The older procedure should
be abolished, and merged in a mensa divorce, with or with-
out the additional provision made that such a divorce can
also be brought for any grounds for a vinculo divorce °a
Doing this with such provision would afford wives all the
relief now available to them under the duplicate proce-
dures, would put husbands and wives on an equal plane
as regards the right to the relief, and would eliminate the
paradoxes and uncertainties. It might be better to omit
such an additional provision and thus lessen, rather than
extend, the situations in which a vindictive spouse can
obtain a legal separation without permitting the other to
remarry.
Thought could also well be given to the idea of work-
ing out a statutory interrelation between the substantially
similar a mensa divorce and the voluntary formal separa-
tion agreements executed by the spouses (now subject
to statutory recognition).51 Provision might be made for
entering an a mensa divorce decree upon a properly proved
separation agreement, thus providing the same sanctions
as are now available under the divorce for the enforce-
"Note, Proper Venue of Suit for Alimony Without Divorce-Ouster of
Jur8diction--Amendment (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 81, noting Woodcock v.
Woodcock, 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (1935).
50 Note, Need for CorrobOration of Plaintiff in a Suit for Alimony With-
out Divorce (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 266, noting Roeder v. Roeder, 170 Md.
579, 185 A. 458 (1936).50a As matters now stand, an a mensa divorce may not be secured for
grounds which are stated in the statute to be grounds for a vinculo di-
vorce alone, Stewart v. Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 66 A. 16 (1907). To be
sure, as pointed out in the text, a wife, as plaintiff, may secure the sub-
stantial equivalent of an a mensa divorce for an a vinoulo ground by
seeking separate maintenance.
51 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 16, Sec. 39A. See, concerning the effect
of separation agreements, Note, The Effect of a Separation Agreement
upon the Surviving Spouse's Right to Administer (1937) 2 Md. L. Rev. 75,
noting Hewitt v. Shipley, 169 Md. 221, 181 A. 345 (1935).
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ment of the obligations of such agreements. This could
be worked out by adding to the grounds for a mensa di-
vorce that the parties had entered into an agreement.2
Thus integrating the agreement into a judicially decreed
status would obviate many later disputes as to voluntari-
ness, validity of execution, consideration, and the like. In
the last analysis, why not stop using the name "divorce"
for all this, and substitute "judicial separation"?
Adjudicating the Custody of Children.
The annulment procedure is probably the most diffi-
cult to understand. The overlapping procedures for judi-
cial separation are probably the most unfair. We shall
later see that the support procedures are the most confus-
ing in actual application. The present topic of the over-
lapping procedures for adjudicating the custody of chil-
dren is outstanding for the quantity of different devices
set up to do exactly one thing.
There are two independent procedures whereby the
question of the proper custody of an infant may be di-
rectly laid before a court for adjudication. There are
several others whereby that problem is determined as an
incident of deciding litigation brought originally for some
other purpose, but in which the matter of custody arises
and can feasibly be decided. There is also statutory rec-
ognition of certain private acts capable of directing who
shall have the custody of children, and there are two minor
procedures which are more administrative than judicial.5 2a
The two direct procedures for adjudicating custody
are the ancient writ of habeas corpus53 and the more re-
" Such a proposal would be analogous to the recently added ground for
absolute divorce of five years voluntary separation. Of course it should
be provided that, even after an a mnensa divorce for voluntary separation
of any duration, the a vinculo one could be obtained by either spouse when
the period had run the full five years.
52a These two minor procedures are under Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art.
4, Sec. 3 (jurisdiction of County Commissioners over pauper children);
and Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 27, Sec. 694A (provisions for children
born to women incarcerated in penal institutions). For that matter, any
statutes concerned with institutions for the care of children relate to
custody. Md. Code (1924) Art. 6, relating to apprentices was repealed
by Md. Laws 1927, Ch. 186.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to deal with procedures for
governing the custody of inebriates, drug addicts, and persons non compos
mentis. A cursory glance over this field will disclose almost as much
confusion as exists within the domestic relation procedures in Maryland.
"3On habeas corpus generally see Md. Code (1924) Art. 42, Secs. 1-18;
and, in connection with the procedure in relation to minors, see Md. Code
(1924) Art. 42, Sees. 19-21.
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cent statutory procedure 4 for determining custody upon
original bill in equity which, while recent of enactment,
merely implements the long-existent power of the Chan-
cellor to exercise the prerogative of the English King as
parens patriae. Even granting the propriety of having
both direct and indirect procedures for adjudicating cus-
tody, the question arises: Why have two of the direct
type?
Historical explanations aside, it would seem substan-
tially sound to preserve the distinction. Habeas corpus
at common law existed primarily to determine the legal-
ity of detention and was more appropriate for those cases
of infant custody wherein it was alleged that the infant
was detained either against his will or against that of the
person naturally entitled to his custody. The general
equity procedure, on the other hand, is better fitted to
adjudicating custody when there is no question of violat-
ing the wishes of infant or proper custodian, but rather
the inquiry is directed to whether the existing custody is
for the best interests of the infant or, as between two or
more possible custodians, which one is best suited to have
it. Inasmuch as some cases of infant custody involve more
of the legality of detention problem and others emphasize
the welfare aspect, it would seem best to preserve the sepa-
rate procedures, although, to be sure, the present habeas
corpus statute is almost broad enough to serve all need-
ful purposes." As matters now stand, with the same sub-
stantive statement of legal principle (best interest of the
child) applicable in all procedures, there is no particu-
lar vice in the duplication, save for a slight difference in
the rules concerning appeals,56 and the fact that support
may be decreed in equity but not by habeas corpus.51
1, Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 80.
15 The provisions of Md. Code (1924) Art. 42, Sec. 21, regulating the use
of habeas corpus in determining the custody of minors, provide a very
flexible procedure, analogous to that of the equity courts under Md. Code
(1924) Art. 16, Sec. 80.
56 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 80, providing the general equity power
over custody does not mention appeals, but apparently appeals from final
decrees or orders under it, as In divorce cases where custody is adjudi-
cated, are permitted freely. On the other hand, rulings on habeas corpus
are not appealable, Annapolis v. Howard, 80 Md. 244, 30 A. 910 (1894) ;
although under Md. Code (1924) Art. 42, Sec. 16, rulings which hold a
statute unconstitutional are appealable, as would be, under Md. Code Supp.
(1935) Art. 5, Sec. 31, any ruling the effect of which is to deprive any
parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the custody of a child.
57 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 80, specifically authorizes the equity
court to order who shall be charged with support and maintenance. The
habeas corpus statute, Md. Code (1924) Art. 42, Sec. 21, while broad and
flexible, has no express mention of such a power and probably does not
contain one by implication.
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So too (remembering that the same standard guides
the determination, whatsoever the type of procedure) it
seems proper to preserve the additional procedures where-
by custody may be adjudicated as an incident of procedures
existent to accomplish other immediate objectives. These
procedures are divorce,5 guardianship in the Orphans'
Courts,5 9 adoption,"° and the Juvenile Court procedures. 1
All of these involve the idea that it is appropriate to de-
cide the proper custody of a child as an incident of ad-
judicating another issue which has been laid before the
court and which, by its general nature, poses the problem
of custody, which can thus be feasibly settled along with
the major issue.
Thus there have been recognized four general types of
situation wherein other matters themselves appropriate for
judicial determination incidentally raise questions of di-
recting who shall have the custody of a child who is in-
volved. A justiciable issue of custody naturally arises
when the parents of the child are litigating a divorce case,
when the child has been left money or property which
must be administered by some adult, when the natural
parents have either abandoned the child or are agreeable
to delegate its rearing to others who wish to adopt it, and
when the child commits delinquent conduct which indi-
cates that he has not been properly disciplined by his
present custodians.
Thus the divorce courts, whether the divorce be granted
or denied,6" may determine custody if such determination
formed part of the relief prayed for. The Orphans' Courts,
primarily interested in handling the fiscal affairs of in-
fants fortunate enough to have money or property, have
the power to appoint guardians The decreeing of an adop-
tion of a minor has the effect (among others) of depriving
the natural parents of their presumptive claim to custody,
58 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 39.
5' See among others, for statutory material on guardianship in the Orph-
ans' Courts, Md. Code (1924) and Md. Code SupD. (1935) Art. 93, Secs.
149 to 210A.
8" Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sees. 74 to 79; Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art.
16, Sec. 74A (extending adoption jurisdiction to residents of government
reservations) ; and Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 172 (permitting the adoption of
adults).
" See, on Juvenile Courts and juvenile procedures, Md. Code (1924) Art.
42, Secs. 19-21; Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 52, Secs. 81 to 90; Md. Code,
Pub. Loc. L. (Flack, 1930) Art. 4, Secs. 623A, 623AA; Md. Code (1924) and
Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 26, Secs. 63-73. Md. Code (1924) Art. 26,
Secs. 47-62 was repealed by Md. Laws 1931, Ch. 323.
62 Prior to 1920 the divorce courts could only adjudicate custody if a
divorce was granted.
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and of conferring that status on the adopting ones.6 3 The
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Courts over delinquent chil-
dren gives them the power (by terminating the improper
custody) to inquire into the propriety of present custody
when the fact of delinquent conduct by the child raises
a suspicion of its impropriety.
Statutory recognition has also been given to two meth-
ods whereby the custody of children may be presumptively
determined by the private acts of the natural guardians,
although, of course, such determination is always subject
to judicial alteration by proper procedure if subsequent
events indicate that the privately determined custody is
not for the best interests of the child. These two meth-
ods are by separation agreements64 between the parents,
and by testamentary appointment of guardian by the sole
surviving parent.6 5 At one time the father had the power
to appoint by his will a guardian to the exclusion of the
mother, but by recent statute it is provided that only the
sole surviving parent shall have such power.
Despite the apparent confusion implicit in having so
many different devices for determining the single issue
of custody of children, it seems substantially sound to pre-
serve all of them. The task of adjudicating custody of
children is a delicate judicial one and one not suited to be
crammed into any inflexible mold. If it can be worked
out by the private acts of those immediately concerned,
as by separation agreements or testamentary appointment,
so much the better. If not, then it would seem next best
to make judicial determination of it at the same time when
there has to be determined the immediate issue brought
to the court's attention which incidentally raises the ques-
tion of custody. And still there should be provided de-
vices for directly calling the issue of custody to a court's
attention if that seems necessary. In view of the fact
that the same substantive rule guides the determination
of the issue, whatsoever the procedure, no substantial in-
justice results from the fact of the overlapping devices
for determining custody.
See supra n. 7, concerning the other implications of adoption.
", Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 16, See. 39A.
" Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 72A, Sec. 4. See also the earlier statute,
Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 153, which empowered a mother to appoint
a testamentary guardian.
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Compelling the Support of Dependents.
Most confusing of all the type procedures is that for
compelling the support of dependents. For not only do
we find that jurisdiction to do so is assigned to all three
kinds of courts and, as well, to certain administrative of-
ficials, but we also note that (as for custody) certain pro-
cedures exist for directly compelling the support, and cer-
tain others compel it as an incident of determining some
other issue concerning which litigation may be originally
brought.
The legal devices for compelling the economically su-
perior member of the family to support the dependent
one divide themselves, first, into those compelling the
overdue payment for specific necessary items and, then,
those compelling the regular payment of stated sums in
the future, which sums, when received, are to be expend-
ed by the recipient dependent or custodian thereof for
necessaries for the dependent one.6
This first type of legal device (recovery for neces-
sary goods, services, or money actually advanced) is, in
Maryland law, implemented by the common law action
(enforceable in a law court, with a jury) against the hus-
band or parentlea for the reasonable value of the necessary
goods, services, or money actually advanced to or on be-
half of the dependent wife or child.67  This device, fre-
quently referred to as the "agency of necessity", is obvi-
ously a less attractive method to the person seeking to
enforce the duty to support than the other ones, which
latter involve the ordering of regular stated payments in
the future. In the first place, the only sanction available
for the enforcement of it is by the usual methods for en-
forcement of money judgments, i. e., attachment and sale
of assets, if any, while for most of the other types there
is available the threat of either a contempt sentence or a
jail sentence after revocation of probation if the payments
are not regularly made.
Then, too, even in acquiring the judgment, if enforce-
able, there are risks to run which make this device an awk-
08 On the distinction between recovery for necessaries advanced and the
ordering of future payments, see Note, Capacity of Child to Secure Court
Order Against Father for Future Support in Ewcess of Amount Stipulated
in Separation Agreement Between Parents (1937) 2 Md. L. Rev. 60, noting
Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937).
Goa See infra, notes 70 and 76, concerning the extent to which Md. Code
Supp. (1935) Art. 72A, Sec. 1, subjects mothers to the various procedures
for compelling support.
87 See Ibid., and cases cited.
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ward one. The plaintiff takes the risk of proving that the
goods or services were necessaries, that provision therefor
had not already been made in other forms by the defend-
ant, and that the recipient was not living apart from the
husband or parent without consent. Let us now see under
what circumstances, and in what other courts, the more
workable judicial orders for regular, stated, future pay-
ments may be obtained. In Maryland, procedures are af-
forded for this in the equity courts, in the criminal courts,
and, by consent, and as an adjunct to the criminal courts,
by orders of the prosecuting attorneys. And confusion,
of one sort or another, reigns within each one of these.
The equity courts may make such orders against hus-
bands for the support of wives, under the name of ali-
mony, either in divorce cases6" (if the wife is a successful
plaintiff) or in cases of alimony without divorce,69 where
the wife could be, did she so wish, a successful divorce
plaintiff. The equity courts may also make orders against
parents" for future support of children, although not un-
der the name of alimony (which applies to wives alone)
either in divorce cases7 (whether a divorce be granted or
denied, so long as the support issue be raised in the plead-
ings), or in cases originally brought to determine the
proper custody of children under the general equity
practice.72
An important distinction between the two types of
equity orders for wives and the two for children is that,
for the former, there is available the sanction of a jail
sentence as for contempt of court for disobedience, while,
for the latter, that is not permitted. For the Court of Ap-
peals has held73 that equity orders for the support of chil-
dren are "debts" and so within the State Constitutional
protection against imprisonment for debt,74 while the sim-
"8 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 15.
" See supra, notes 41, 49, and 50.
"0 Prior to Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 72A, Sec. 1, the father alone was
chargeable with the support of the children. This statute imposes the
duty equally on the parents, and, presumptively, authorizes an equity court
to order a mother, as well a s a father, to contribute. The statute has not
been construed with reference to this point, but was apparently overlooked
by the Court of Appeals in the recent case of Boyd v. Boyd, 11 A. (2d)
461 (Md. 1940), where it was said, 11 A. (2d) 465: "Whether husband
and wife do or do not continue to live apart, the responsibility for the sup-
port, maintenance and education of their infant child rests upon the
father."
71 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, See. 39.
7 Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 80.
8 Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
71 Md. Const., Art. 3, Sec. 38.
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ilar orders for support of wives constitute "alimony" and
not "debts" and so are not thus protected. This historical
and unrealistic distinction between substantially similar
things led to complications when, in a divorce case, the
court imposed a single order for both wife and children.
The question arose whether the disobedience was to an
alimony order, permitting of a jail sentence, or to a mere
support order, having only the sanction of attachment of
property. The question was finally resolved in favor of
allowing the contempt sentence to be imposed for disobe-
dience to such orders mingling provisions for both wife
and child. 5
On the other hand, an order of an equity court, whether
in a divorce or custody case, which directs payments for
a child alone, may not be enforced with the aid of the
sanction of the contempt sentence and is, at best, but a
money judgment. In order to acquire the weapon of a
threatened jail sentence to force a father16 to support a
child, the criminal technique now about to be discussed
must be followed out. For children, this is the only way
a jail sentence may be threatened; for wives, on the other
hand, such a sentence may be threatened either through
the criminal technique or the equity one. Now we turn to
the criminal techniques as such, remembering that there
is a parallel in that the statutory rules are applied, in con-
tested cases, by judicial sentence after petit jury convic-
tion, or, in consent cases, after a hearing before the State's
Attorney. The possibility of prosecution, conviction, and
sentence in the older fashion no doubt may serve to moti-
vate many accused persons to consent to the newer
"streamlined" procedure before the State's Attorneys.
On the criminal side three different statutes apply to
four different situations. For wives and legitimate chil-
dren, for which as we have seen, the common law and
equity procedures are also available with varying emphasis,
75 On this, see Note, "Alimony" for the Support of Both Wife and Child
(1938) 3 Md. L. Rev. 93, noting Cohen v. Cohen, 173--Md. 696, 197 A. 564
(1938); and Note, Further on "Alimony" for the Support of Both Wife
and Child (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 367, noting Knabe v. Knabe, 6 A. (2d) 366
(Md. 1939).
76 While, as pointed out supra n. 70, a mother can be subjected to an
equity order, probably she cannot be subjected to the criminal procedure
for non-support, in view of the wording of the applicable criminal statute,
cited in the following footnote. The statute applies to "any person who
shall . . . neglect to provide for . . . his wife or minor child . . ." This
is susceptible of the interpretation that it applies only to fathers, and
not to mothers.
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a single statute77 sets up the separate crimes78 of deser-
tion and non-support. The provisions for an alternative
consent procedure before the State's Attorney, instead of
in routine court procedure, apparently apply under this
statute only to Baltimore City although the parallel provi-
sions in the destitute parent and bastardy statutes are
State-wide.
This procedure, which on the support side roughly
parallels that for destitute parents and bastards, provides
the sanction of a threatened jail sentence for not support-
ing wives and legitimate children by making the fact of
non-support a crime for which the offender can be pun-
ished. In contested cases which go through the routine
court procedure, the usual technique of presentment and
indictment (or information, in Baltimore City), right to
jury trial, verdict, and judgment of guilty are followed.
Then, in the discretion of the court, in lieu of a sentence
to the House of Correction, the accused husband or father
may be released, under bond or on probation, upon con-
dition of making regular stated payments in the future,
and, for a violation of the condition, the suspension of sen-
tence may be revoked and the offender forced to serve
his sentence.
Whereas for wives and legitimate minor children there
are available to compel support the common law, the
equity, and the criminal methods, for destitute parents
and illegitimate children only criminal techniques are pro-
vided. The procedure for destitute parents79 most closely
approximates the criminal method for wives and legitimate
children. There is the parallel procedure of routine court
conviction, suspension of sentence, and probation to pay
stated sums, and, as well, the consent procedure under the
immediate supervision of the State's Attorney's office.
Within this procedure there exists considerable doubt
whether it may be applied to compel illegitimate children
to contribute to the support of their mothers, or, for that
matter, their fathers.9 a
77 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 27, Sees. 87, 87A to 87E, and Md. Code
(1924) Art. 27, Sees. 88 to 90.
78 Desertion and non-support are separate crimes under the statute,
Pritchett v. State, 140 Md. 310, 117 A. 763 (1922).
79 Md. Code (1924) Art. 27, Secs. 91 to 93, as amended, Md. Laws 1939,
Ch. 675.
71aThe statute, cited in the preceding footnote, punishes any "adult
person" who shall fail to provide for a "parent or parents" and, in the
procedural sections, refers to the accused as the "adult child." Md. Laws
1937, Oh. 74, adding a new Section 16 to Article 1 of the Md. Code (1924)
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Slightly different from the other criminal techniques
is that for compelling the father of a bastard child to sup-
port it. This procedure, the oldest of them all, is found
in a separate article"° of the Code from the general crim-
inal one. and works out the social problem of support of
illegitimates in terms of a penalty on the father for the
crime of fornication with the mother-an odd approach
to a social problem. Here, too, there is parallel provision
for routine court procedure and for consent proceedings
before the prosecutor, for bonds, for suspension of sen-
tence as an inducement to make the required regular pay-
ments, and for imposition of punishment if they be not
made.
There are many paradoxes, even among the criminal
techniques themselves. One is the territorial jurisdiction
problem. When the one entitled to receive the support
and the one required to give it live in different Maryland
counties, there is grave doubt as to which, if either of the
counties is the proper one to entertain the prosecution.
When one lives without the state and one within it is more
difficult. The statute for wives and legitimate children
is silent on the matter, the destitute parent one requires
both parent and child to be residents, and the bastardy
one apparently applies only if the fornication occurred in
Maryland, and will not apply otherwise, even though birth
of child, residence of mother, and residence of father are
all here.81
("Rules of Interpretation"), provides: "The word child or its equiva-
lent shall be construed to include any illegitimate child, except in mat-
ters of inheritance, descent or distribution of real and personal prop-
erty, unless such a construction would be unreasonable." It is arguable
that the re-enactment of the destitute parent statute, in the light of
this previous addition to the Code article governing interpretation of
statutes, brought illegitimate children within the purview of the crim-
inal statute. Consider that, at the same session of the legislature, Md.
Laws 1937, Chs. 37, 38, 39, the law was so changed as to permit a mother
to recover for the seduction, injury to, or wrongful death of an illegiti-
mate child; to permit an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful
death of the mother; and to provide that "child" shall include illegiti-
mate child for purposes of relief. The problem of the application of
the destitute parent statute to illegitimate children is analogous to the
problem discussed, supra notes 70 and 76, concerning whether mothers,
as well as fathers, may be forced to support legitimate children. It is
a little more plausible that an illegitimate will be held compellable to
support his mother, rather than his father, in view of the fact that prac-
tically all the statutory amelioration of the status of the illegitimate has
had reference to legal relations to the mother.
so Md. Code (1924) and Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 12, as amended, Md.
Laws 1939, Ch. 182.81 See RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT or LAwS, MD. ANNOT. (1936) Secs. 456,
457.
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Then, too, a certain amount of confusion results from
having three different criminal statutes for the four dif-
ferent kinds of support problems. It would improve mat-
ters to consolidate them into one, with due allowance for
inescapable differences in detail. As between the crim-
inal techniques, on the one hand, and the non-criminal
ones, on the other, there is also much duplication and para-
dox. Wives have two equitable and one criminal meth-
ods for putting recalcitrant husbands in jail. Fathers may
be put in jail for not supporting children only by the crim-
inal technique, although equitable orders not carrying thejail sentence sanction may also be imposed on them. Moth-
ers, on the other hand, are subject to the equitable orders
(without contempt sentence) but not to the threat of crim-
inal prosecution."2
The confusion of these overlapping devices has created
a difficult problem arising frequently either in the Criminal
Court or the Domestic Relations Department of the State's
Attorney's office of Baltimore City. When a father who
has been ordered to contribute support by an Equity Court
disobeys this order and is prosecuted by the criminal
method, the threat of criminal punishment is available
only as to instalments ordered by the Criminal Court to
be paid in the future. For the instalments in arrears un-
der the Equity order, the prosecuting witness has only
the dubious asset of a money judgment.
Within the limits of the equity technique itself, the
overlapping and confusion raises the same problem as for
divorce and custody. Having both divorce and alimony
without divorce for the same grounds is, of course, an
historical accident. Appending jurisdiction to order sup-
port for children to divorce and custody cases creates the
same problems as appending custody jurisdiction itself
to cases originally brought for other purposes. It may
be wise to permit all matters appertaining to a focal one
to be solved at once.
Most paradoxical is the distinction between the com-
mon law jurisdiction to award reimbursement for items
already expended and the other types of procedure which
order future and regular payments. Perhaps it would sim-
plify matters to abolish the former and merge it in the
latter, although this would raise constitutional questions
of the right to jury trial.
1. See 8upra, notes 70 and 76.
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Then, as between the equity and criminal techniques,
there are differences in the fact situations bringing into
play the respective methods. A wife may not obtain an
equity order for future support unless the husband has
committed recognized divorce grounds, but parents may
be subjected to such orders for children (given proper
jurisdiction) merely because it is necessary. The criminal
techniques, on the other hand, cannot be called into play
until after the husband or father has already once neg-
lected his duty.
Conclusion.
Throughout the text of this comment the emphasis has
been more on sketching a picture of the existing defects
in the various procedures, rather than on advocacy of spe-
cific reforms, although occasional mention of such possi-
bilities was made. It is believed that a mere visualization
of the existing procedures, when viewed in the whole, will
make the point that something needs to be done about
the Maryland domestic relations procedure.
Common to all the four types of procedure is duplica-
tion of function, i. e., the provision of two or more devices
for accomplishing the same thing. This, while somewhat
of a defect, is not the worst aspect of the matter. It would
not be particularly troublesome to have duplicate proce-
dures accomplishing the same thing, if the substantive
rights of the parties concerned were the same within each.
This is so, for instance, for the Baltimore City courts, which
include three different common law courts, all doing the
same thing, with only minor differences in jurisdiction,
and two equity courts with no differences. This duplica-
tion is tolerable because no substantial injustice results.
But it is not so clear that injustice is avoided with re-
spect to the differences in the annulment procedures with
their vagaries of territorial jurisdiction, service of proc-
ess, and proof; nor as between the separate techniques
for judicial separation, which give the wife more privi-
leges than the husband.
Duplication of function, particularly in the custody and
support areas, is probably justified in that it is wise to
permit such latter matters to be decided as incidents of
determining other matters originally laid before the partic-
ular court. The support devices are the most complicated,
both with reference to quantity of procedures, as to sub-
stantial differences in application of sanctions, and in the
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chances of the support money being collected. There are
also substantial differences in the operative facts calling
into play the respective procedures. Probably the most
pressing need for reform lies in the support area.
Most drastic and, .of course, most Utopian of possible
reforms, is the setting up of a separate Domestic Relations
Court in Baltimore City. Many urban areas have set up
these specialized courts to handle within one tribunal all
domestic relations litigation. While, no doubt, many con-
stitutional and other obstacles would have to be sur-
mounted to establish one for Baltimore City, yet it would
not be unfeasible, in view of the fact that the City already
has eleven judges who rotate among six named courts,
which six exercise three basic functions.
But, short of that, and more possible of immediate pro-
vision, reform is desirable within each of the four basic
categories of domestic relations procedure. A house-clean-
ing of each within the limits of our present constitutional
and judicial set-up would accomplish much. Thought
should be given to simplifying and clarifying the annul-
ment procedure; to straightening out the paradox of two
separate judicial separation procedures; to equalizing the
powers of the various tribunals allowed to handle custody,
even if it be desirable to preserve the duplications; and to
lessening the confusion within the support procedures.
Duplications should be abolished wherever feasible, equal
powers in all respects should be given to tribunals which
do duplicate work, and there should be carefully avoided
any substantial differences in the rights of the parties de-
pendent on the nature of the particular procedure which
may be assigned to or chosen for a given problem.
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